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CITIES SUPPORTED BY STICKS IN THE MUD: A 
VARIATION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND AND 
STRUCTURES CAUSED BY GROUND WATER 
REMOVAL 
Susan M. Kincaid* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It starts slowly. First you see cracks across the ceilings and down 
the walls. Windows and doors no longer close smoothly. As the water 
table declines in the landfill beneath your century-old house, its 
wooden support piles rot and structural settlement accelerates, ren-
dering the premises unsafe for occupation. Finally, the local building 
inspector condemns your house. 1 
Ground water removal may cause subsidence or settlement2 of the 
land surface in two common ways. One prevalent cause of subsidence 
or settlement is a change in lateral pressure in shallow subsurface 
layers. 3 For example, if construction or repair of a sewer, tunnel, or 
building foundation is underway in an area where shallow subsoil 
* Managing Editor, 1987-1988, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Wells, Shaky Foundations: Beacon Hill Buildings Called 'Unsafe' from Water Table 
Damage, Boston Tab, June 4, 1985, at 1, col. 2. 
2 Depending on the depth and amount of water removed and the area affected, writers have 
distinguished between land subsidence and settlement. E.g., Comment, Controlling Land 
Subsidence: A Proposal for a Market-Based Regulatory Scheme, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1208, 
1208 n.1 (1984). Subsidence may refer only to the compaction of several deep layers of soil as 
a result of the removal of underground fluids or solids. [d. Settlement may refer to the land 
surface's sinking as a result of the compaction of shallow subsurface layers. [d. Either the 
removal of fluids, semi-fluids, or solids, or the weight of the load on the surface may cause 
settlement. [d. at 1210. This Comment will not distinguish between subsidence and settlement 
in this manner, because case law has used both terms to describe either phenomenon. 
3 T. DUNNE & L. LEOPOLD, WATER IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 165,173-75 (1984). For 
reasons that vary with the porosity of the subsoil in the area, adjoining land may subside as 
supporting lateral strata either compact as they lose water content or flow away with the 
water. See id. 
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layers hold an amount of water, water or a mixture of water and 
soil will flow into the trench. As excavators pump water and mud 
out of the trench, they may actually be removing water or material 
that provides lateral or subjacent support for adjoining land. A 
second form of subsidence or settlement occurs when water-users 
pump ground water from water-bearing formations, called aquifers, 
located far below the surface. 4 In this situation, a large tract of land 
subsides when the removal of water creates a decline in pressure in 
the aquifer. When the pressure declines, the clay and other materials 
in the aquifer compact. 5 The combination of the loss of buoyant 
support in the aquifer and the weight of overlying rock or soil causes 
the land surface to sink. 6 
The first type of subsidence occurs often, and has long been the 
subject of lawsuits. The outcomes of these suits depend upon juris-
dictional variations in the common law. The second type is a major 
but localized problem in the Southwest and west coast of the United 
States, as well as in Japan, Thailand, and Mexico. 7 Cities such as 
Brooklyn and Philadelphia have also faced subsidence problems in-
volving shifts in shallow subsurface strata and changes in water table 
levels.s 
One variation on settlement caused by shallow subsurface with-
drawals of water is the settlement of buildings that rest on wooden 
piles preserved by water in the subsoil. Instead of providing buoyant 
support by filling voids as it does for soil in the settlement situations 
described above, ground water "supports" wooden piles by prevent-
ing their decay.9 This settlement problem occurred at one building 
in Boston, Massachusetts as early as 1929.10 Property owners have 
4 F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 439 (3d. ed. 1979). 
5 Id.; Comment, supra note 2, at 1210. 
6 See Comment, supra note 2, at 1210 & n. 23. 
7Id. at 1208-09; see also Teutsch, Controls and Remedies for Ground Water-Caused Land 
Subsidence, 16 Hous. L. REV. 283, 283 (1979) (discussing subsidence in the Houston-Galveston 
area); Note, Subsidence: An Emerging Area of the Law, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 891, 894 (1980) 
(discussing subsidence in California, Arizona, and other locales). 
8 See Rohter, Puzzle in Brooklyn: The Bizarre Sinking of a 20-Block Area, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 3, 1986, at 51, col. 1; Stevens, Sinking Homes Shock Neighborhood, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
2, 1986, at 52, col. 4 (discussing settlement of buildings in Philadelphia). 
9 HALEY & ALDRICH, INC., REPORT ON GROUNDWATER IN BACK BAY BOSTON 44-46 (1985) 
[hereinafter B.RA. REPORT] (report lor the Boston Redevelopment Authority). 
10 Pokorny, Boston Down Under: Stabilizing Water Table is Key to 'Mooring'Imperiled 
Townhouses, Boston Globe, Aug. 19, 1985, at 38, col. 2. When cracks appeared in the walls 
of the Boston Public Library in 1929, an investigation showed that its wooden support piles 
had rotted as a result of ground water loss. Leaks in a nearby sewer had drained off the 
ground water. Id. 
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only recently recognized that this particular type of settlement is 
more extensive and serious than previously thought. Long term 
lowering of ground water levels and the decay of wooden piles sup-
porting older structures would be a disaster that can be prevented. 11 
Costs of replacing piles under one building in Boston, Massachusetts 
have exceeded $200,000, and more than 200 buildings could be af-
fected. 12 The settlement of buildings supported by water-preserved 
wooden piles is prevalent in certain areas of Boston13 and other older, 
coastal cities where buildings rest on wooden piles in wet subsoil 
that is often landfill. This Comment analyzes support law and ground 
water law as they apply to this variation of the settlement problem. 
This Comment first assesses the possible application of support 
law to the wooden-pile support problem to determine whether a 
landowner, whose building has settled as a result of a loss of ground 
water needed to maintain subsurface wooden piles, may recover 
under common law principles of subjacent or lateral support and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. In many cases, these common law 
principles do permit recovery for settlement damage due to with-
drawal of ground water that provides lateral or subjacent support. 14 
Neither these cases nor the Restatement (Second) explicitly dis-
cusses ground water that prevents the decay of subterranean piles. 
Nevertheless, as applied in other cases in which subsidence of land 
and structures occurred as a result of ground water removal, support 
law may protect landowners' interests in the ground water needed 
to sustain piles that support surface structures. 
On the other hand, landowners' rights to supporting ground water 
are also usufructory. Requiring the presence of ground water to 
maintain subsurface wooden piles is an appropriation of ground 
water for a landowner's use and enjoyment. If courts characterize 
this subsurface piles-water support system as a use of ground water, 
then building owners' recovery for the repair of the piles and any 
ensuing settlement damage depends upon the principles of ground 
water law in that jurisdiction. 15 This Comment assesses the ability 
of both support law and ground water law to address this particular 
settlement issue. This Comment concludes that modern ground 
water law principles are best able to allocate the costs of preventing 
11 B.R.A. REPORT, supra note 9, at 53. 
12 See infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text. 
13 Pokorny, supra note 10, at 37, col. 1. 
14 See infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 96-104, 112-31 and accompanying text. 
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subsidence due to a loss of ground water and to assign responsibility 
for withdrawals among many users of a water table. 
II. RECOVERY BASED ON SUPPORT LAW 
Some jurisdictions have held that subsidence caused by the re-
moval of ground water involves the law of support as opposed to the 
law of ground water.16 The right to support of land in its natural 
state is the basic right of landowners to enjoy the support of adjoin-
ing land so that their land does not sink or subside when adjoining 
landowners excavate or otherwise alter their land. 17 Lateral support 
describes the right of land to the support of the land lying next to 
it. 18 Subjacent support refers to the right of land to the support of 
the material lying beneath it. 19 
The rules of both subjacent and lateral support are closely related 
and similar.20 The source of the difference between the two is the 
physical relationship of the respective owners' interests. 21 The duties 
and liabilities following from the right to subjacent support generally 
describe situations in which ownership of the surface and ownership 
of the subsurface layers have been severed. 22 Although withdrawal 
of ground water that supports land is the removal of a subjacent 
supporting substance, the distinction between these two related and 
similar sets of rules blurs when an adjoining landowner removes only 
16 Massachusetts, Missouri, and Washington have applied support law when the settlement 
resulted from the removal of only ground water. Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 
620, 195 N.E.2d 65,67 (1964); St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Kaw Valley Tunneling, Inc., 
589 S.W.2d 260, 268 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1979) (en banc); Bjorvatn v. Pacific Mechanical Constr., 
Inc., 77 Wash. 2d 563, 567, 464 P.2d 432, 434 (1970) (en banc). Alaska, Illinois, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and Rhode Island have applied support law when settlement resulted from the 
removal of ground water and sand or soil. Williams v. Anderson Constr. Co., 105 F. Supp. 
497,498 (D. Alaska 1952); Chicago City Ry. v. Rothschild & Co., 213 Ill. App. 178, 186 (1919); 
City of Columbus v. Williard, 7 Ohio C.C. 113, 116,7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 33, 34 (1893); Witherow 
v. Tannehill, 194 Pa. 21, 23, 44 A. 1088, 1088 (1899); Prete v. Cray, 100 R.I. 209, 216, 141 A. 
609, 613 (1928). 
17 1 AM. JUR. 20 Adjoining Landowners § 37 (1962) [hereinafter 1 AM. JUR. 20]. 
18 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1291 (5th ed. 1979). 
19 [d. Jurisdictions vary in their treatment of this lateral versus subjacent distinction. Some 
states and the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognize the difference between the two. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECONO) OF TORTS §§ 817-821 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECONO)]. 
20 1 AM. JUR. 20, supra note 17, § 77 (1962). 
21 RESTATEMENT (SECONO), supra note 19, §§ 817-821 scope and introductory note. 
22 See 1 AM. JUR. 20, supra note 17, § 79. Courts typically refer to subjacent support rules 
between subjacent owners and not between adjacent owners. Annotation, Liability of Land-
oumer Withdrawing Ground Water from Own Land for Subsidence of Adjoining Owner's 
Land, 5 A.L.R. 4TH 614, 616 (1981). 
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ground water and not any other supporting materials.23 The Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts states a rule specifically for withdrawing 
subterranean substances24 and categorizes this section as applying 
to both lateral and subjacent support. 25 A comment to § 818 indicates 
that the privilege to withdraw a subterranean substance is not a 
defense to liability arising from the right of the surface owner to 
"lateral and subjacent support."26 In other words, the Restatement 
(Second) section on the withdrawal of subterranean substances is 
not limited to subjacent support. Since there is no severance of 
ownership of subjacent layers in the wooden-piles settlement prob-
lem,27 this Comment concentrates on rules of lateral support, but 
also considers subjacent support concepts. 
The right to lateral support is absolute with regard to land in its 
natural condition. 28 Hence, courts invoke a strict liability standard 
when an adjoining landowner interferes with this right.29 When im-
provements on the land have suffered a loss of support, however, 
courts differ in how they modify the standard. The first judicial 
approach is to apply a strict liability standard for land and improve-
ments. The second approach is to apply strict liability for both land 
and improvements only if the improvements did not contribute to or 
materially cause the subsidence. The third is to apply a negligence 
standard whenever improvements are present on the land. 
A. Strict Liability for Land and Improvements 
The most expansive standard within the law of support is strict 
liability for both land and structures. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington applied this rule in Bjorvatn v. Pacific Mechanical Construc-
tion, Inc. 30 In Bjorvatn, the court held the defendant strictly liable 
for lowering the water table in the process of excavating for a city 
sewer and, as a result, removing support from under the plaintiff's 
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, § 818. 
2A [d. 
25 [d. 
26 [d. comment b. Massachusetts does not distinguish between a duty to provide lateral 
support and a duty to provide subjacent support. Note, A General Survey of the Rights and 
Duties of Adjoining Landowners in New England, 39 B. U. L. REV. 228, 242 (1959). 
27 In a situation where subsurface wooden piles support a structure, it is unlikely that there 
is a severance of ownership of subjacent layers. Even an easement for public sewer pipes 
probably does not run directly beneath the settling property. In most instances the pipes lie 
under an adjoining street or sidewalk. 
.28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note ~9, § 817 comment b. 
29 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199,207-08 (1877). 
30 77 Wash. 2d 563, 464 P.2d 432 (1970) (en bane). 
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house. 31 Because the digging of a deep trench deprived the com-
pressible soil of its natural water content, the plaintiff's land sank, 
causing cracks in the foundation and walls of his house. 32 The court 
held that the state constitution mandated compensation for private 
property damaged in the course of public construction. 33 The plain-
tiff's right to recovery rested on the strict liability standard that 
the court used because the harm occurred in the exercise of the 
power of eminent domain.34 
The Bjorvatn court relied on a standard that the Supreme Court 
of Washington had set in Muskatell v. City of Seattle. 35 In Muskatell, 
the court found the defendant city strictly liable for subsidence 
damages when its construction of a sewer resulted in the subsidence 
of the plaintiff's land and the sinking of his building. 36 The Supreme 
Court of Washington concluded that the issue of whether the city 
was negligent was immaterial in an action brought under the con-
stitution to recover damages for the removal of lateral support. 37 
Once the court established that the removal of the wet saI1d from 
the excavation trench, and nothing else, directly caused the subsid-
ence of the land, strict liability attached. 38 In addition, the court did 
not allow distinctions among loss of support caused by removing 
either soil, silt, quicksand, or water from under the adjoining land.39 
Although strict liability has survived in Washington support law 
cases for over forty years, each case stressed that the state consti-
tution's eminent domain provision required the strict liability stan-
dard.40 
In an Illinois case where inverse condemnation was not a question, 
however, the court's language indicated that the strict liability stan-
dard would also apply.41 In Chicago City Railway v. Rothschild & 
Co., a company was excavating and in the process removed the 
31 [d. at 567-68, 464 P.2d at 435. 
32 [d. at 564-65, 464 P.2d at 433. 
33 [d. at 567, 464 P.2d at 434-35. 
34 [d. at 567, 464 P.2d at 434. 
35 10 Wash. 2d 221, 116 P.2d 363 (1941). In Muskatell, the plaintiff brought an action under 
the state constitution to recover for building damages that resulted from the city's removal 
of wet sand from a trench during the construction of a sewer in front of the plaintiff's property. 
[d. at 223, 116 P.2d at 365. 
36 [d. at 235-36, 116 P.2d at 370. 
37 [d. at 233, 116 P.2d at 369. 
38 See id. at 233-36, 116 P.2d at 370. 
39 [d. at 238, 116 P.2d at 371. 
40 See Bjorvatn, 77 Wash. 2d at 567, 464 P.2d at 434; Muskatell, 10 Wash. 2d at 223, 116 
P.2d at 365. 
41 Chicago City Ry. v. Rothschild & Co., 213 Ill. App. 178, 186 (1919). 
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lateral support of neighboring land on which the plaintiff owned 
trolley tracks.42 The Illinois court found the excavating company 
liable for subsidence damages. 43 The court applied a strict liability 
standard in this case to the subsidence of land containing trolley 
tracks but did not explicitly extend the standard to all improve-
ments. 44 In addition, the court noted that the defendants had re-
moved both soil and water during the excavation,45 but indicated 
without deciding the question that the excavating company would 
still be liable for subsidence even if it had removed only ground 
water. 46 
Although ensuring plaintiffs recovery, the strict liability standard 
does not attach in most subsidence cases where improvements are 
present on the land. The court that has used the strict liability 
standard broadly and without qualification has emphasized that its 
state constitution's takings clause required it.47 In addition, the only 
authority for an unqualified strict liability standard for both land and 
improvements in a non-takings case was a case in which the improve-
ment on the land was a line of trolley tracks. 48 Even in Muskatell, 
the court did not apply strict liability for improvements until after 
it had addressed the jury's determination that the weight of the 
improvements had not contributed to the subsidence. 49 
B. Strict Liability for Land and Improvements After Determining 
C ausation-in-F act 
In lateral support cases involving improvements, courts have lim-
ited the strict liability standard by first deciding whether the im-
provements contributed to or caused the subsidence and then apply-
42 Id. at 180-82. 
43 I d. at 186. 
44 See id. at 182. 
45Id. at 183-84. 
46 Id. at 186 (dicta). After finding the defendant liable, the court stated, "it is unnecessary 
for us to decide whether in such case the abutting property owner would be liable if the 
depression were caused solely by the withdrawal of subsurface percolating waters, and we 
leave the question where it is." Id. 
47 Bjorvatn, 77 Wash. 2d at 567, 464 P.2d at 434. 
48 Chicago City Ry., 213 Ill. App. at 186. 
49 Muskatell, 10 Wash. 2d at 236, 116 P.2d at 370. A later case that relies on Bjorvatn and 
Muskatell makes it clear that, although the right to lateral support in Washington is based 
on the constitutional takings prohibition and also exists between private parties, the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving that the taking indeed took place. Bay v. Hein, 9 Wash. App. 774, 
777, 779, 515 P.2d 536, 538, 539 (1973). In the case of land with improvements on it, this 
means that the plaintiff must prove that the improvements to the land did not increase the 
neighbor's duty to provide lateral support. Id. at 777, 575 P.2d at 538. 
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ing strict liability only if the land would have subsided without the 
improvement. 50 In some cases, to recover damages for land and 
structures, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the weight 
of the building did not materially increase the lateral pressure and 
as such did not directly cause the subsidence. 51 In others, defendants 
must raise the issue of an improvement's causing subsidence as an 
affirmative defense. 52 For example, in Williams v. Anderson Con-
struction Co., during the course of the defendant's digging the foun-
dation of an apartment building, a mixture of "fluid soil" and wet 
sand "oozed from plaintiff's property into the hole in which the 
defendant was digging."53 The dispositive issue was whether the soil 
on the plaintiff's side of the boundary fell away of its own weight, 
and in doing so caused the settlement of the plaintiff's house. 54 Upon 
finding that the flow of wet sand caused settling of the land and 
consequently the damage to the apartment building, the court held 
the defendant strictly liable for withdrawing the necessary lateral 
support for the plaintiff's land. 55 The District Court of Alaska re-
fused to consider whether the defendant was negligent in his efforts 
to shore up the house because in this case liability was not predicated 
on negligence. 56 Thus, having first determined that the removal of 
the wet soil, and not the weight of the building, caused the settle-
ment, the court held the defendant strictly liable. 
Rhode Island also requires a threshold determination of causation-
in-fact before strict liability can attach when improvements are pres-
ent. 57 In Prete v. Cray, the city of Providence, Rhode Island exca-
vated a ditch for the repair of a sewer in the street in front of 
plaintiff's property and drove down plank sheathing to support the 
walls of the trench. 58 At a depth of thirty-eight or forty feet, the 
50 E.g., Williams v. Anderson Constr. Co., 105 F. Supp. 497, 498 (D. Alaska 1952); Prete 
v. Cray, 100 R.1. 109, 216, 141 A. 609, 612 (1928). 
51 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 199 Misc. 237, 242, 98 N.Y.S.2d 643, 648 (1950); Gladin v. 
VonEngeln, 195 Colo. 88, 92, 575 P.2d 418, 421 (1978). In VonEngeln, the court stated that 
there is a presumption that the weight of the buildings contributed to the subsidence. To 
overcome this presumption and recover for damage to structures, the plaintiff must prove 
that the building's weight did not materially increase pressure on the land causing it to subside. 
VonEngeln, 195 Colo. at 91-92, 575 P.2d at 420-21. 
52 E.g., Farnandis v. Great N. Ry., 41 Wash. 487, 495, 84 P. 18-20 (1906). 
63 105 F. Supp. 497, 497-98 (D. Alaska, 1952). 
64 I d. at 498. The court did not hold expressly that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing 
that the weight of the structure did not cause the subsidence. Id. However, it appears that 
the court treated the issue as one for the plaintiff to address at the outset because it is one 
of the court's initial findings. Id. at 497-98. 
55 Id. at 498. 
56 Id. 
57 Prete v. Cray, 49 R.1. 209, 214-15, 141 A. 609, 612 (1928). 
58 Id. at 215-16, 141 A. at 612-13. 
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excavators reached a bed of quicksand that "flowed somewhat like 
water. "59 The defendants, in removing the quicksand as fast as it 
flowed in from the plaintiff's land, destroyed the support of the 
plaintiff's land. 60 Because the land sank from the curb line of the 
street all the way back to the front of the foundation of the house, 
while the rear of the foundation was not disturbed, the court said it 
was clear that the weight of the plaintiff's buildings did not cause 
the subsidence of the soil. 61 The court agreed with the line of au-
thority that placed full responsibility upon the person who interfered 
with the support of a neighbor's land and held for the plaintiff.62 The 
court's rationale was that by erecting buildings, landowners should 
not lose their rights to the lateral support of land. 63 When their land 
settles because an adjoining owner has invaded this right, landown-
ers are entitled to recover for all damage directly resulting from 
that invasion, as long as the weight of the building on the land did 
not cause the subsidence damage. 64 
c. Negligence Standard for Improvements 
Like Alaska and Rhode Island, Massachusetts has also recognized 
that the strict liability standard should apply to an injury to land in 
591d. at 216, 141 A. at 613. 
00 Id. 
61 Id. at 216-17, 141 A. at 613. 
621d. at 215, 141 A. at 612. 
63 See id. at 213, 141 A. at 612. 
64 I d. The court in Prete referred to a general rule of liability for improvements to land. I d. 
at 213, 141 A. at 611. Under this rule, when the removal of support caused the subsidence 
damage to land and buildings, the neighbor who removed the support was not liable for 
damage to the building unless he had been negligent. Id. In the absence of negligence, the 
defendant was liable only for damage to the land. Id. at 213-14, 141 A. at 612. The court in 
Prete modified this general rule and held the strict liability standard applicable whenever the 
land subsided of its own weight. Id. When a plaintiff complained ofthe settlement of a building, 
the court in Prete favored the approach that calls for an initial finding of whether the weight 
of the building or the removal of support proximately caused the subsidence damages to both 
the improvement and the land. Id. Accord, Gladin v. VonEngeln, 195 Colo. 88, 91-92, 575 
P.2d 418, 420-21 (1978). The court in Gladin overruled Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp. v. 
Salardino, 125 Colo. 516, 245 P.2d 461 (1952), to the extent that Salardino had held that strict 
liability could not be imposed if there were improvements to the land. Gladin, 195 Colo. at 
92, 575 P.2d at 421. 
The reasoning of cases like Williams and Prete leads to the application of the strict liability 
standard in an equitable manner, because this reasoning permits a finding of fact to establish 
the cause of the damage to a structure. If the possibility of recovery were limited only to 
damage to land, then potential plaintiffs would be discouraged from bringing suits for the loss 
of support because the damage award for land alone may not justify the cost of a suit. As a 
result, in a dense urban area where open land is scarce, or wherever it would be difficult to 
determine the actual cause ofthe settlement of a building, excavators would have less incentive 
to undertake the expense of a careful study of the dangers of the lateral support loss that 
could result from their activities. 
------------ ------------
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its natural state. 65 A long line of Massachusetts cases, however, has 
limited recovery to injury to land only, unless the defendant was 
negligent. 66 For example, in a 1964 case, Gamer v. Town of Milton, 
a defendant contractor removed water from the subsoil in an area 
surrounding a pond and thus caused the subsidence of the plaintiffs' 
adjoining land. 67 As the contractor drained the pond, he also drained 
water from the subsoil in the area. 68 As he should have foreseen, 
the soil in the area became compacted from its loss of water, and 
the plaintiffs' houses settled. 69 The court predicated recovery for the 
settlement of the plaintiffs' land and buildings on the negligent man-
ner in which the defendant contractor excavated in the area. 70 
In allowing recovery for settlement of structures when the defen-
dant negligently removed only water, Gamer extended earlier Mas-
sachusetts decisions in which defendants, in negligently removing a 
mixture of water and sand or soil, were liable for damage to both 
land and structures. The court in Cabot v. Kingman had applied the 
rule requiring negligence for recovery for structures before the turn 
of the century.71 The plaintiff in Cabot complained of subsidence 
caused by the defendants' removal of wet sand, silt, or quicksand 
that had flowed into the defendants' trench for sewer construction. 72 
Despite the disagreement of three state justices, including Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, who urged the application of water law doctrine, 73 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stressed that the water 
removed from the trench carried the plaintiff's supporting soil away 
with it.74 Since this appeal was taken on exceptions to the trial court's 
dismissal for a failure to state a cause of action and its directed 
verdict for the defendants, the court did not dwell on the damage 
issue and whether recovery extended to land, or structures, or 
65 E.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 
680, 682, (1958); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 201 (1877); see also, City of Columbus v. 
Williard, 7 Ohio C.C. 113, 116, 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 33, 34 (1893) (approving Gilmore v. Driscoll, 
122 Mass. 199 (1877)). 
66 Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65, 67 (1964); New York 
Central, 337 Mass. at 472-73, 149 N.E.2d at 682; Gilmore, 122 Mass. at 205. 
67 346 Mass. at 618-19, 195 N.E.2d at 66. 
68 Id. 
69Id. at 618-19, 195 N.E.2d at 66 (quoting findings of court-appointed auditor). 
7°Id. at 621, 195 N.E.2d at 67. 
71 See Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 406, 44 N.E. 344, 345 (1896). The rule was 
announced in Gilmore, 122 Mass. at 205. 
72 Cabot, 166 Mass. at 404, 44 N.E. at 344. 
73 Id. at 407, 44 N.E. at 345. 
74Id. at 405, 44 N.E. at 345. 
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both. 75 The plaintiff, however, complained of the cracking and set-
tlement of brick buildings,76 and the court found the defendants 
negligent in failing to require its contractor to take precautions to 
prevent the quicksand from running into the trench. 77 This finding 
indicates that the court was applying a negligence standard for injury 
to buildings. The later case, Gamer, cites Cabot as direct authority 
for the general rule of strict liability for removing the support of 
land in its natural state. 78 
Gamer, which limited recovery to land unless the defendant was 
negligent in causing the loss of support, remains the law in Massa-
chusetts. 79 If improvements are present on the land and a neighbor's 
activities cause the land to subside and injure the improvements, 
the neighbor is strictly liable for the land itself but liable for the 
improvements only if he or she was negligent. 8o The rationale for 
having different standards of liability for improved and unimproved 
land is that by erecting improvements landowners should not in-
crease their neighbors' responsibility to provide support.81 As long 
as neighbors take reasonable care against foreseeable injury, they 
will be liable only for subsidence to land and escape any liability for 
damage to buildings or other improvements. 
75Id. at 407, 44 N.E. at 345. 
76 See id. at 404-05,44 N.E. at 344-45. 
77 See id. at 406, 44 N.E. at 345. 
78 Gamer, 346 Mass. at 620, 195 N.E.2d at 67. 
79 See id. at 621, 195 N.E.2d at 67. 
80 New York Cent. R.R. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680, 
682 (1958). At first, this analysis seems like a logical way to limit the expansiveness of strict 
liability. The problem with using the negligence standard in this way is that it cuts off liability 
at injury to the land solely because the land has an improvement on it. This standard fails to 
consider that the improvement may not have contributed in any way to the subsidence. When 
improvements are present on the land, using the negligence standard in this way will fail to 
provide recovery if such land subsides irrespective of the weight of any improvement. 
A more realistic approach to the liability issue assigns responsibility for a defendant's 
activity according to the activity's effect on a landowner's natural right to support. The cases 
that take this approach focus on a factual finding of whether the land would have subsided 
without the improvements. E.g., Williams v. Anderson Constr. Co., 105 F. Supp. 497, 498 
(D. Alaska); Prete v. Cray, 49 R.I. 209, 216, 141 A. 609, 613 (1928); see also Gladin v. 
VonEngeln, 195 Colo. 88, 91-92, 575 P.2d 418, 420-21 (1978) (ruling on a question of jury 
instructions, the court found that the choice of liability standard hinged on whether the 
subsidence would have occurred had the land remained in its natural state). In many cases, 
the results may not differ very much from those of the Massachusetts approach. The reason 
is that excavators who recognize the possibility of the subsidence of neighboring land will also 
account for any improvements on it when they take due care to prevent subsidence. Never-
theless, treating the effect of the improvements on the land as a threshold issue allocates the 
risk among parties based on the real effect of any improvements on the land. 
81 Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 201 (1877). 
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D. Choice of Liability Standard and the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts 
The Restatement (Second)'s comment to § 818 on the withdrawal 
of subterranean substances emphasizes that the "right of the surface 
owner to lateral and subjacent support of his land in its natural state 
is paramount,"82 and the privilege of withdrawal does not in itself 
serve as a defense to strict liability.83 It follows from the paramount 
importance of the strict liability standard that, where improvements 
are concerned, before a court lowers the standard to one of negli-
gence, it should first determine whether the improvements were a 
material factor in the loss of support caused by the withdrawal of a 
subterranean substance. If an improvement did not contribute to or 
materially increase the settlement, strict liability remains the ap-
propriate standard and should extend to all settlement damage fol-
lowing directly from the loss of support for land. 84 If the land would 
not have settled without the presence of the improvement, then 
strict liability is not an appropriate standard. Only after an initial 
finding that the presence of the improvement contributed to or ma-
terially increased the subsidence should a court apply a negligence 
standard. 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, § 818 comment b. 
&'lId. § 818. The introduction to the Restatement (Second) chapter on support of land 
describes two different approaches that may have given rise to the two conflicting judicial 
approaches toward the limitation on strict liability when improved land has subsided. Id. §§ 
817-821 scope and introductory note. The earlier of the two theories regards the right to 
support as an easement. Under this theory, the right to support is "a natural easement 
subjecting the supporting land to a natural servitude." Id. As such, the right to support is in 
the supporting land. One result of adopting this theory is that the right extends only to the 
supported land itself and not to support needed by any improvements on it. Invaders of this 
right would then be strictly liable for the mere removal of support. Id. The introduction to 
this Restatement (Second) chapter does not state explicitly whether this liability standard 
extends to improvements on the land when the land in its natural state would have subsided 
regardless of the presence of improvements. See id. 
The second theory regarding the limit of strict liability when there are improvements on 
the land views the right to support as a right to the integrity of the supported land and as 
such is a right "in respect to the supported land." I d. One result of adopting this view is that 
the right to support would exist both for land in its natural state and improvements on it. In 
addition, the mere withdrawal of support would not be a violation of this right. Liability would 
require negligence or intention to cause harm. Id. 
While neither view has unqualified acceptance, the earlier, easement-servitude theory has 
more heavily influenced the development of the law of support with respect to land in its 
natural state. Id. The Restatement (Second) mentions that the second theory has determined 
the law of support in cases where improvements are present. Id. This emphasis on the right 
to support of land in its natural state indicates that for a loss of support caused by the 
withdrawal of subterranean substances, the authors of the Restatement (Second) § 818 had 
the easement-servitude theory in mind. 
84 See Prete v. Cray, 49 R.I. 209,217, 141 A. 609, 613 (1928). 
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If the improvement did materially contribute to or cause the sub-
sidence, then negligence is the appropriate standard by which to 
judge the defendant's actions. The reasoning is that by erecting 
improvements landowners should not be able to increase their neigh-
bors' duty to provide support for adjacent land. 85 The initial finding 
of causation-in-fact prevents neighboring landowners from escaping 
their duty to maintain the natural support of land that has been 
improved. 86 When neighbors must meet an objective standard of due 
care with respect to improvements, landowners who have made 
improvements have neither increased nor decreased their neighbors' 
burden to provide support for land in its natural state. 
When the improvements to land are subsurface wooden piles and 
the removal of ground water causes their decay and a subsequent 
loss of support, the negligence standard is almost always appropriate 
because the land itself would not have settled when the water table 
dropped. The scope of duty with respect to the wooden-pile support 
system then is to take reasonable care in any removal of supporting 
ground water so that the water table remains high enough to prevent 
decay of wooden piles. If the water table remains high enough, 
improvements to the land will remain intact. In the same way that 
an excavator must provide shoring for neighboring land with a build-
ing on it, a neighboring landowner would not be able to remove 
supporting ground water without taking a reasonable degree of care 
to prevent the decay of a wooden-pile support system. 
The basis of the foregoing analysis regarding this artificial support 
system is to characterize the system's water dependence as a form 
of support from ground water. The water, however, does not support 
the piles by providing buoyancy. Rather, the chemical properties of 
water provide support by preventing decay of the piles. 87 Because a 
court may characterize this maintenance of the piles as nothing more 
than a use of ground water, it is necessary to consider the rules 
governing the use of ground water. 
III. RECOVERY BASED ON GROUND WATER LAW 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts illustrates a clear turning point 
in the law of support and that of ground water withdrawal, because 
it completely reverses the position of the first Restatement on the 
question of the withdrawal of water and loss of support.88 Prior to 
85 Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 201 (1877). 
86 See Prete, 49 R.I. at 213, 141 A. at 611-~2. 
87 See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text. 
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, § 818 app. reporter's note. 
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this reversal, the first Restatement refused to recognize liability for 
the loss of support when a defendant removed water from under 
another's land.89 This idea, which had taken hold in England in 
1869,90 gave rise to a rule that denied recovery whenever water was 
the withdrawn supporting substance. 91 Courts have been seeking 
ways to limit this rule ever since. 92 
One of the earliest cases addressing the problem of liability for 
the removal of supporting ground water, New York Continental 
Jewel Filtration Co. v. Jones, characterized the problem as an injury 
without legal remedy.93 The plaintiff in Jones contended that her 
land had settled and that the foundation and walls of her house had 
cracked as a result of the defendant's excavation for a subway tunnel 
in the street next to her property.94 The District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals noted that the soil in the vicinity was "composed of sand 
and gravel heavily charged with water" and that the tunnel had to 
be drained to facilitate construction. 95 Reversing a lower court that 
had granted recovery to the plaintiff, the court held that, if the 
defendant's withdrawal of ground water from beneath the plaintiff's 
land caused the damage, the injury was without a legal remedy. 96 
The court based its holding on the common law right of landowners 
to drain ground water from beneath their own land and cited Pop-
plewell v. H odkinson97 as controlling. 98 
In Popplewell, the Court of the Exchequer denied the owner of 
cottages built on "wet and spongy"99 land any recovery for sub sid-
89 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 818 (1939). 
00 See Popplewell v. Hodkinson, 49 L.R.-Ex. 248, 251-52 (1869). 
91 See New York Continental Jewell Filtration Co. v. Jones, 37 App. D.C. 511, 515 (1911). 
92 See e.g., Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc. 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 (1968); Friendswood 
Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978). 
93 Jones, 37 App. D.C. at 514. 
94 ld. at 512. 
951d. at 513. 
96 ld. at 514-15. 
97 4 L.R.-Ex. 248 (1869). 
98 Jones, 37 App. D.C. at 514-15. The court in Jones distinguished United States v. Alex-
ander, 148 U.S. 186 (1893), in which the government, pursuant to a federal statute authorizing 
tunnel construction and condemning a right-of-way for the tunnel, drained the plaintiff's well. 
Jones, 37 App. D.C. at 517. The court in Jones said that, because the relief in Alexander 
turned on the language of the statute authorizing the activity that caused the loss of water, 
Alexander was not on point. ld. at 517-18. Since there was no similar statutory authorization 
for the defendant's activity in the District of Columbia, the court refused recovery for settle-
ment damage to the plaintiff's property. ld. at 518. But cf. Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 
Mass. 617, 620, 196 N.E.2d 65, 67 (1964). In the absence of any statutory authorization the 
court in Gamer found an actionable offense for a municipal contractor's removal of pure water 
and refused to distinguish earlier Massachusetts cases that held that the loss of support caused 
by the removal of a mixture of water and soil was actionable. ld. 
99 Popplewell, 4 L.R.-Ex. at 249. 
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ence damages caused by the draining of water in an adjacent exca-
vation for the construction of a church. 10o The plaintiff argued that 
the right to support from ground water should be equated with the 
right to support from adjacent soil. 101 The plaintiff argued further 
that the right to underground water and the right to support from 
water are distinct. 102 Nevertheless, the court declared the issue one 
of water law and not support law when it found that "although there 
is no doubt that a man has no right to withdraw from his neighbor 
the support of adjacent soil, there is nothing at common law to 
prevent his draining that soil, if, for any reason it becomes necessary 
or convenient for him to do so. "103 
Hence, from an early dispute between the owner of cottages and 
the builder of a church, a rule emerged in England denying liability 
for subsidence caused by ground water removal. 104 This rule was 
based on the naive belief in the mysterious nature of ground water, 105 
and has since been applied to deny recovery in cases in which sub-
sidence occurs as a result of the loss of supporting ground water. 106 
The Jones court reiterated that the reason for this rule stems from 
the uncertainty about ground water: 
100 [d. at 251. The court added that even if the plaintiff had a right to the support of 
underground water, he could not recover under these circumstances because "he had no right 
to suppose that the adjacent land would be used for the erection of such cottages as he himself 
erected, or of other buildings requiring equally little support." [d. at 252 (dicta). 
101 [d. at 250. 
102 [d. 
103 [d. at 251-52. The court added that because the land was close to an "important and 
populous town" the plaintiff should have known the land would be developed and consequently 
drained for construction. [d. at 252 (dicta). 
104 See id. at 251-52. When the analysis of the problem of subsidence caused by the removal 
of ground water begins with the premise that if the supporting material is water, then the 
rules of the ownership of ground water apply, and there can be no recovery in any jurisdiction 
that has adopted the English Rule of absolute ownership set forth in Acton v. Blundell, 152 
Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235, 12 Meeson & Welsby, 324, 354 (1843). The court in Acton formulated 
this rule based on the principle that the owner of the land surface, since his claim of ownership 
includes all that is beneath the surface, may dig in his land and appropriate for any purpose 
any water he finds there. [d. If, in exercising this right, he drains water from underground 
springs that extend to a neighbor's property, any inconvenience to the neighbor is an injury 
without remedy. [d. The court believed that this rule for ground water ownership must 
necessarily differ from that of surface water because of a perceived difference in the nature 
of surface and ground water. [d. at 351, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1234. The basis of the distinction 
between the two was the court's declaration that, while surface water flows openly in sight 
of all neighbors, ground water does not move in the sight of others and no one knows who 
has taken what portion of the water. [d. at 349-50, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233. See also Garland, 
Subsidence Resulting From the Removal of Ground Waters, 12 S. TEX. L.J. 201, 205-06 
(1970); Comment, supra note 2, at 1215-16. 
105 Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233, 12 Meeson & Welsby at 350. 
106 New York Continental Jewell Filtration Co. v. Jones, 37 App. D.C. 511, 518 (1911); 
Langbrook Properties Ltd. v. Surrey County Council, 3 All E.R. 1424, 1440 (Ch. 1969). 
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[P]ercolating subterranean water is a wandering thing, which, 
like the air, is not subject to any fixed rules of law. The existence, 
origin, course, and movement of such waters, and the causes 
which govern and direct their movements, are so involved in 
mystery, secrecy, and uncertainty as to render any attempt to 
establish or administer any set of legal rules with respect to 
them practically impossible. 107 
Commentators have criticized these results because the rule's basis 
in the mysterious nature of ground water is erroneous. 108 Modern 
ground water management techniques are sophisticated enough to 
measure accurately the impact on a water table of one party's tap-
ping a ground water source.109 Recognition of the potential for harsh 
results and the rule's basis in outmoded scientific assumptions have 
led courts to attempt to depart from the rule. 110 One court that 
recognized a more modern ground water rule permitting certain 
withdrawals defined as reasonable applied the reasonable use rule 
to a ground-water-loss subsidence case. 111 Other jurisdictions have 
gone a step further to hold that any negligent withdrawal of water 
that causes subsidence is actionable. 112 
Texas is an example of a jurisdiction that has expanded the scope 
of liability to include negligence. 113 In 1973, the Supreme Court of 
Texas, in Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus-
tries, departed from the rule of nonliability for subsidence caused by 
107 Jones, 37 App. D.C. at 516. The movement of ground water also mystified the court in 
Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861). The Frazier court said that there was no right 
to ground water 
[b]ecause the existence, origin, movement and course of such waters, and the causes 
which govern and direct their movements, are so secret, occult and concealed, that 
an attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved 
in hopeless uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible. 
lOB Comment, When the Well Runs Dry: A Proposal for Change in the Common Law of 
Ground Water Rights in Massachusetts, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 445, 478-79 (1982); 
Teutsch, supra note 7, at 290. 
109 Comment, supra note 108, at 462. 
no See State v. Michels Pipeline Constr. Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278,291-93,217 N.W.2d 339,345-
46, modified 63 Wis. 2d 278, 303a, 219 N.W. 308, 309-10 (1974); see also Friendswood Dev. 
Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 28-29 (Tex. 1978) (court applied the English 
absolute ownership rule, which denied recovery for subsidence damages caused by ground 
water loss, to the instant case but held prospectively that plaintiffs can recover if defendants 
remove water negligently, willfully, or wastefully). 
III See Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 439, 248 A.2d 106,113 (1968) (finding that 
under this rule the defendant's pumping large quantities of ground water for on-site mining 
operation was reasonable). 
n2 Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 30. 
n3 [d. 
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the removal of underground water.114 The court held prospectively 
that a showing of negligence would provide an exception to the old 
rule of non liability that allowed almost unlimited withdrawals of 
ground water regardless of the effects on surrounding land. 115 Land-
owners brought Friendswood as a class action seeking recovery for 
subsidence damages caused by the defendants' withdrawals of large 
quantities of water from wells on the defendants' lands. 116 The trial 
court applied the old common law rule that, absent any maliciousness 
or waste, landowners are not liable for damage to their neighbors' 
lands when the damage results from the landowners' exercise of 
their rights to withdraw ground water from beneath their own 
land.ll7 In reversing summary judgment for the defendants, the 
Court of Civil Appeals held that the plaintiff had a cause of action 
in negligence and that the record showed a genuine issue of material 
fact. lIB 
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Civil Appeals 
and affirmed the trial court because it declared itself bound by 
common law as it existed during the time of the defendants' ac-
tions. 119 In a dramatic shift, however, the court held prospectively 
that in addition to willful waste and maliciousness, a showing of 
. negligence will further limit the application of the common law rule 
that allowed unlimited ground water withdrawals. 120 
In carving out this exception to the rule that permitted almost 
unlimited withdrawals of water, the Friendswood court faced a dif-
ficult choice: either discard an established rule of water law and 
allow damage suits worth millions of dollars or affirm an archaic 
doctrine that was not only based on a lack of knowledge about ground 
water but also the subject of prior cases in which the court itself 
had strongly urged legislative reform. 121 The Texas legislature had 
heard this call for reform. Three years before Friendswood the 
legislature had created the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence 
District in an effort to remedy the area's subsidence problem. 122 In 
114 [d. at 30-31. 
115 [d. 
116 [d. at 21-22. 
117 [d. at 22. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. at 29. 
120 [d. at 30. The court refused to rule retroactively because the case involved a long-
established rule governing a property right. Id. at 29. 
121 Comment, supra note 2, at 1223 n. 136. 
122 Act Creating the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District, ch. 284, §§ 1, 3 1975 
Tex. Gen. Laws, 672, 672-73. The District's board of directors has the power to issue or deny 
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rendering the Friendswood decision, the Supreme Court of Texas 
relied heavily on expressed legislative intent to regulate subsidence 
and withdrawals of water.123 The court noted that the legislative 
action had followed thorough geological and hydrological studies that 
produced accurate knowledge and measurement of ground water. 124 
The court reasoned that limiting the harshness of an archaic, judge-
made rule was in harmony with expressed legislative intent. 125 The 
court also noted that the enjoyment of ground water ownership, long 
recognized as part of the ownership of the land surface, should not 
receive a special immunity from tort liability, because the use of 
other aspects of surface or subsurface ownership were not insulated 
from tort liability when their use proximately caused harm to ad-
joining landowners. 126 
A Maryland appellate court used a less dramatic approach than 
that of the Texas court in applying water law doctrine to a subsidence 
claim in Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc.127 In Finley, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the defendant's pumping of water for its quarrying 
operations adjacent to the Finley farmland resulted in a lowering of 
the water table underlying their land. 128 Purportedly, the "draw-
down" caused sink holes and subsequent subsidence of the Finley 
property. 129 The plaintiffs argued that ground water law should not 
apply because the eventual result of the defendant's actions was 
subsidence. Therefore, the court should look to rules governing the 
support of land. 130 
On appeal from a directed verdict for the defendant, the Finley 
court declared first that, "[a]s the present case involves the use of 
subterranean water, we will now consider the law applicable to such 
waters. "131 The court characterized the problem as one of water law 
because, since the Finley land did not move "sidewise" into the 
permits for wells, regulate well locations, and adopt any rules to prevent further subsidence. 
[d. §§ 24, 28, at 679, 681. 
123 See Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 29-30. 
124 [d. at 29. 
125 [d. at 30. 
126 [d. 
127 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 (1968). 
128 [d. at 429, 248 A.2d at 108. 
129 [d. at 430-31,248 A.2d at 108-09. Expert testimony indicated that the pumping of water 
rather than a removal of land near the 'property line caused the subsidence. See id. Further-
more, the plaintiffs did not contend that the defendant was negligent in his quarry operations 
or in his pumping of water from it. [d. at 431, 248 A.2d at 109. 
130 [d. at 442, 248 A.2d at 115. 
131 [d. at 432, 248 A.2d at 109. 
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Teeter quarry, cases on lateral support did not apply.132 Having 
distinguished the plaintiff's line of cases because the facts indicated 
that the defendants in each case had removed soil, silt, or quicksand, 
the court expressed what it called a "vital distinction" between those 
cases and cases that involved only the movement of water.133 While 
it did not resort to the naivete of earlier decisions that discussed the 
mysterious nature of underground water, the court based its dis-
tinction on the fact that water, unlike quicksand, has a "dynamic 
quality" and "flow[s], shift[s], or chang[es] position in response to 
the vagaries of weather and climatic conditions. "134 The court con-
cluded that: 
It is primarily because of this dynamic quality that we cannot 
hold that interference with the support provided by water is 
subject to the same rules of absolute liability that are imposed 
on a landowner who deprives his neighbor of the natural support 
provided by soils and other more solid materials. 135 
The court thus based its choice of applicable doctrine on a somewhat 
arbitrary assumption that quicksand and other liquid or semi-liquid 
substances do not flow, shift, or change position in response to 
climatic change. The court reached this conclusion despite expert 
testimony that thoroughly described the process that led to the sink 
holes. This testimony indicated that the water functioned with clay 
and other materials to provide support to the surface land and that 
seasonal changes in rainfall had a marked effect on the ability of the 
underground system to withstand the pressure of the soil on the 
surface. 136 
132Id. at 442, 248 A.2d at 115. 
133 Id. at 443, 248 A.2d at 116. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 See id. at 430~1, 248 A.2d at 108-09. A geologist testified that the rock formation under 
the Finley land was characterized by faulting, fractures, and voids, through which ground 
water moved naturally at a slow speed. Id. at 430, 248 A.2d at 108. Teeter's pumping of water 
caused the velocity of the flow toward the quarry to increase SUbstantially. Id. "This action 
resulted in the dislodging of soils forming the roofs of the solution channels as well as causing 
soils from the clay mantle to be removed by percolation and flow, thus leaving voids .... " 
Id. The clay that formed plugs in these solution channels may have been directly washed 
away or desiccated when no longer in contact with the water. Id. at 431, 241 A.2d at 109. The 
overlying mantle of soils over the bed rock, unsupported by earth, then formed the roof of a 
vault that may have been three to ten feet high. Id. When heavy rains came in the late winter 
or early spring, "the sudden rush of water infiltrate[d] and saturate[d] this clay and precipi-
tate[d] a series of collapses. These propagate[d] upwards until the surface of the land cave[d] 
in and cause[d] sink holes." Id. Despite expert testimony describing the interconnection of 
the movement of solid subsurface material, the amount of ground water in the soil, and 
seasonal changes in rainfall, id. at 430~1, 248 A.2d 108-09, the court distinguished the loss 
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Having concluded that the applicable rule was within the body of 
water law, the Finley court noted a trend toward limiting the old 
rule of nonliability because it led to harsh results and possible 
abuses. 137 The court then stated, however, that under either theold 
rule of nonliability or one that permits reasonable withdrawals the 
plaintiffs could not recover.138 Under the Finley court's interpreta-
tion of a rule that permits reasonable withdrawals, the defendant 
had the right to use the water beneath his land for any purpose 
connected with a legitimate and reasonable use of the land. 139 Be-
cause pumping water in the process of quarrying was such a use, 
the plaintiff could not recover. 140 The court concluded that "[a]s it is 
prima facie established that Teeter's use of the percolating waters 
on its land is a legitimate and reasonable one, it is incumbent upon 
of lateral support caused by the movement of earth or quicksand from the loss of lateral 
support caused by the removal of ground water because it believed that the solids or semi-
solids did not move in response to climatic changes. ld. at 443, 249 A.2d at 116. Modern 
hydrology indicates this distinction may have been incorrect. See DUNNE & LEOPOLD, supra 
note 3, at 3-6. 
137 Finley, 251 Md. at 435-36, 248 A.2d at 111. This trend has developed into a rule called 
the American rule. ld. Under the American rule, ground water users escape liability for 
removing ground water to the injury of another if the removal is for some useful or beneficial 
purpose relating to the land from which the water is taken. ld. at 436, 248 A.2d at 111-12. 
The landowner's appropriation of ground water from beneath his land must be for a reasonable 
or beneficial use on that land. Comment, supra note 108, at 482. 
The court in Finley noted that courts sometimes refer to the American rule as either the 
reasonable use rule or the correlative rights rule. Finley, 251 Md. at 436 n. 3, 248 A.2d at 
112 n. 3. However, Bristor v. Cheatham recognized that the two terms refer to two distinct 
doctrines. ld. (citing Bristor v. Cheatham). California cases have distinguished the correlative 
rights rule as "a refinement or possibly an extension of the scope of the reasonableness of the 
use rather than a departure from the basic principle of reasonable use underlying the American 
Rule." ld. Commentary has also observed that an important difference between the reasonable 
use rule and the correlative rights rule is that, as between two local and reasonable users, 
the correlative rights rule provides for an allocation of water when supply becomes scarce by 
giving each user a fair and just portion. See Comment, supra note 108, at 491. On the other 
hand, the reasonable use rule categorizes uses as either reasonable or unreasonable based on 
the situs and purpose of use and fails to assess the reasonableness of a particular interference. 
See id. at 484. Commentary has also noted that the reasonable use rule embodies some of the 
same deficiencies of the absolute ownership rule, since both permit capturing unlimited 
amounts of ground water. I d. The reasonable use rule limits the absolute ownership rule only 
by recognizing a local user's rights against users who transport ground water for off-site use 
or users who appropriate ground water wastefully or maliciously. ld. Finally, the reasonable 
use rule fails to take into account modern hydrological knowledge and the ability to measure 
the impact of withdrawals on a water table. ld. The rigidity of both the absolute ownership 
rule and the reasonable use rule creates all-or-nothing resolutions to disputes that a scientific 
approach to ground water allocation would resolve more equitably. ld. at 486. 
138 Finley, 251 Md. at 439, 248 A.2d at 113. 
1391d. 
14°ld. at 439, 248 N.E.2d at 114. 
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the Finleys to show that such was unreasonable. "141 The court de-
scribed unreasonable uses as selling water for commercial purposes, 
wasting water, and maliciously or negligently using water.142 The 
court then held that without proof by the Finleys that Teeter acted 
wastefully, maliciously, negligently, or in any other unreasonable 
way in using water in its quarrying operation, the injury to the 
plaintiff remained without a legal remedy. 143 
Citing cases holding that sales or waste of water were unreason-
able uses, the Finley court correctly found no liability under a rule 
prohibiting withdrawals for specific unreasonable purposes. Without 
examining the effect of pumping great quantities of water in the 
quarrying business, however, the Finley court found the use of 
water in quarrying a reasonable use because it was a legitimate 
business on the defendant's own land. 144 The Finley court's finding 
illustrates a problem of the rule permitting "reasonable" uses, 
namely that, the reasonable use rule offers no guidance for choosing 
between two reasonable and local users. 145 Although the Finley court 
found no liability because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the 
defendant was negligent or wasteful, the court's language actually 
masks a decision that amounts to favoring the larger user. 146 Because 
141 Id. at 441, 248 N.E.2d at 114. 
142Id. at 441, 248 N.E.2d at 114-15. The court then listed three cases cited by the plaintiffs 
in their favor as providing that negligent appropriation of ground water is unreasonable and 
hence grounds for liability. Id. at 441, 248 N.E.2d at 115. The court stated that it would 
assume that these three cases rested on the law of ground water despite evidence in each 
that defendants drained solid matter out from under the plaintiffs' properties. Id. at 441 n. 5, 
248 N.E.2d at 115 n. 5. This assumption is incorrect because the court in each of the three 
cases explicitly stated that its decision rested upon principles of lateral support. Gamer v. 
Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 621, 195 N.E.2d 65,67 (1964) ("The liability, then, lies in the 
failure to take reasonable precautions to protect the plaintiffs' adjacent land and does not 
involve questions of the rights of ownership and use of water." (footnote omitted)); N ew York 
Cent. R.R. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680, 682 (1958) ("The 
same obligation [of using reasonable care not to remove lateral support] is imposed upon the 
excavator in withdrawing a mixture of silt and water as if he [were] removing only sand."); 
Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 405, 44 N.E.2d 344, 345 (1896) ("[T]he defendants had no 
right to take away the soil of the plaintiff ... and ... it is immaterial that the soil ... had 
been carried away by percolating water."). The Finley court failed to recognize that this 
Massachusetts line of cases requires the application of lateral support law and not water law 
to the water-loss subsidence damage of which the Finleys complained. Moreover, this line of 
cases requires strict liability where the damage is to land in its natural state like that in 
Finley. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text. 
143 Finley, 251 Md. at 442, 248 N.E.2d at 115. 
144 Id. at 439, 248 N.E.2d at 113. 
145 See Comment, supra note 108, at 484. 
146 Cf. id. ("[T]he [reasonable use] rule purports to safeguard proprietary rights in ground 
water, but actually it recognizes only a local user's right not to be harmed by a transporter 
or by a wasteful ground water withdrawal."). 
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the reasonable use rule permits unlimited withdrawals for an ac-
ceptable use, if a large user's use is reasonable, then this rule permits 
withdrawing huge quantities of water irrespective of effects on 
neighboring land, unless the plaintiff can surmount the hurdle of 
proving waste, malice, or sale for off-site use. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin expressed a similar dissatisfac-
tion with the rule permitting reasonable withdrawals of ground 
water for failing to protect small users from larger, but still non-
malicious or nonwasteful, users.147 In State v. Michels Pipeline Con-
struction, Inc., the plaintiff-landowners complained that construc-
tion of a sewer resulted in a lowering of the water table so that their 
wells dried up, and as a result of the subsidence of the overlying 
land, buildings were damaged. 148 The court adopted "the rule set 
forth in Tentative Draft No. 17 of the Restatement of the Law 
Second, Torts, as proposed on April 26, 1971, for adoption by the 
American Law Institute."149 The court interpreted this proposed 
section as broadening the protection of the reasonable use rule. 150 
Under this view, the reasonable use rule encompasses an evaluation 
of the reasonableness of favoring one user over another. 151 Although 
the Michels court focused on the loss of well water, it did not exclude 
the subsidence claim from the application of the proposed section's 
rule. 152 Therefore, there was no indication that the basis for liability 
147 See State v. Michels Pipeline Constr. Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 301, 217 N.W.2d 339, 350, 
modified 63 Wis. 2d 303a, 219 N.W.2d 308 (1974). The court also rejected the correlative 
rights rule because it would be difficult to administer and there was no scarcity of water in 
Wisconsin. See id. at 300,217 N.W.2d at 349. 
148 [d. at 281-82,217 N.W.2d at 339-40. 
149 [d. at 301,217 N.W.2d at 350. The proposed section read: 
A possessor of land or his grantee who withdraws ground water from the land and 
uses it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to liability for interference with the use 
of water by another, unless 
(a) The withdrawal of water causes unreasonable harm through lowering the water 
table or reducing artesian pressure, 
(b) The ground water forms an underground stream, in which case the rules stated 
in sec. [sic] 850A to 857 are applicable, or 
(c) The withdrawal of water has a direct and substantial effect upon the water of 
a watercourse or lake, in which case the rules states in secs. [sic] 850A to 857 are 
applicable. 
[d. at 302-03, 217 N.W.2d at 350-51 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A 
(Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971». 
150 [d. at 302,217 N.W.2d at 350. 
151 [d. at 303,217 N.W.2d at 352. 
152 See id. at 303a, 217 N.W.2d at 351. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin overruled the order 
of the trial court, which denied a cause of action for subsidence caused by the loss of ground 
water. [d. at 303a, 217 N.W.2d at 351. 
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found in this Restatement (Second) section would not apply to sub-
sidence damage. 
The Michels court also noted that a comment to the proposed 
Restatement (Second) draft indicates that, as between reasonable 
users, the rule would place similar burdens on persons similarly 
situated. 153 As applied to a subsidence case, this language indicates 
that the court would consider balancing support as one use against 
other possible uses. In doing so, the court would evaluate the un-
reasonableness of the subsidence harm to plaintiffs' land and im-
provements. l54 However, this rule does not necessarily offer com-
plete protection for landowners who are using a water table as 
support. A landowner using ground water as support would most 
likely be an earlier user. Because the earlier user should not be able 
to dictate the acceptable level of withdrawals, a court should attempt 
to distribute the burden of preventing or repairing subsidence dam-
age among all users of a water table. 
As it appears in the Restatement (Second), the first exception to 
the general rule of nonliability reads much the same as the proposed 
draft.155 Comments to § 858 indicate that the exceptions to nonlia-
bility incorporate all grounds of liability that the common law rec-
ognizes. l56 For example, clause (l)(a) reflects the modern tendency 
to extend protection to harm created by large, but nevertheless 
beneficial, uses on overlying land. 157 
As described above, § 858 of the Restatement (Second) carves out 
a more equitable exception to a general rule of nonliability than do 
earlier ground water law approaches. 158 Making harm from lowering 
the water table an exception to a general rule of nonliability reflects 
modern hydrological knowledge159 and bases liability on the reason-
ableness of the harm to neighboring landowners. 16o In a subsidence 
situation, the Restatement (Second)'s objective standard makes each 
party's right to ground water more secure than it would be under 
the Finley interpretation, which bases reasonableness on the situs 
and purpose of use. 161 Because the unreasonable harm standard spe-
153 [d. at 303-03a, 217 N. W.2d at 351. 
154 See id. at 303-03a, 217 N.W.2d at 351. 
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, § 858(1)(a). 
156 [d. comment c. 
157 See Michels, 63 Wis. 2d at 302,217 N.W.2d at 350. 
158 See Comment, supra note 108, at 499. 
159 [d. at 497. 
160 See id. at 499. 
161 See Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 439, 248 A.2d 106, 113 (1968). 
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cifically applies to any lowering of the water table, contractors, 
excavators, or water-users, who need to withdraw ground water for 
their activities would conduct thorough preliminary studies to pre-
dict the effects of their activity on the water table. 162 This rule is 
effective in preventing subsidence because it stresses the importance 
of maintaining the water table. Whether land settles as a result of 
the loss of water's buoyant support, or wooden piles decay as a result 
of the loss of water's chemical properties, this standard protects the 
landowner whose primary interest is in maintaining the water table 
at pre-withdrawal levels. 
In addition, if a court characterizes the problem of decayed piles 
as one for water law and accepts Restatement (Second) § 858, then 
as long as the withdrawal is for a beneficial purpose, the standard 
by which a court should judge a defendant's withdrawal is the rea-
sonableness of the harm to the plaintiff through the lowering of the 
water table. 163 In situations where water is not withdrawn for a 
beneficial use, the defendant has no protection. Therefore, were this 
rule the law in the jurisdiction where homeowners' subsurface 
wooden support piles had decayed, as long as homeowners could 
prove that a withdrawal was not beneficial and caused unreasonable 
harm, they could enjoin future removal and recover damages for 
injury due to past withdrawals. 
If a withdrawal of ground water was for a beneficial use, a court 
following the Restatement (Second) § 858 rule would look at whether 
the resultant harm was reasonable. l64 A comment to Restatement 
(Second) § 858 states that the salient factors in evaluating the un-
reasonableness of the harm are whether the withdrawals are in 
quantities not common to the locality and the fairness of placing the 
cost of alternatives on the person or organization whose withdrawals 
render the local source inadequate. 165 A court could then allocate the 
burden of replacing piles according to factors such as the amount of 
ground water the defendant needs to withdraw, the amount of water 
the plaintiff-landowner needs to maintain piles, the character of the 
162 Cf. Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 619, 621, 195 N.E.2d 65,66,67 (1964) (in 
finding that defendant negligently removed supporting ground water, the court elaborated on 
the precautions that the defendant should have taken even though the court based its decision 
on support and not water law principles). 
163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, § 858(1)(a); see also id. § 858 comment f 
(comparing reasonableness standard applicable to riparian owners). 
164 See State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 302-03a, 217 N.W.2d 339, 
350-51 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, § 858 comment e. 
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 19, § 858 comment e. 
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land, levels of water usage and recharge rates characteristic to the 
area, and alternative sources of both water and support for each 
party. These factors seem to favor a use such as the subterranean-
piles support system, which does not actually withdraw water. 
However, the comment to § 858 also recognizes that any beneficial 
withdrawal of ground water necessarily includes the right to affect 
the source to some degree. 166 If a large and beneficial withdrawal 
were necessary, courts would most likely favor the necessary and 
beneficial use over maintaining the water table at a level high enough 
to prevent decay of wooden piles. The cost of finding an alternative 
water supply would probably exceed the cost of replacing the wood 
with steel, concrete, or any material that does not need water to 
maintain its strength. 
The ground water doctrine outlined in the Restatement (Second) 
provides an opportunity for thorough inquiry into users' needs and 
the availability of local sources to meet those needs. The most eq-
uitable water law test becomes one of balancing one user's interest 
in maintaining the water table against another user's interest in 
withdrawing a reasonable amount for a beneficial use. 167 
Before concluding whether ground water law or support law 
should govern the relationships among the parties when subsurface 
wooden piles require ground water to prevent their decay, this 
Comment describes an example of the failure of such a support 
system as the water table has fallen in a neighborhood in Boston, 
Massachusetts. The Boston settlement problem provides a back-
ground against which this Comment will analyze how a court should 
characterize the problem in a way that achieves a solution that 
adequately balances building owners' and water users' interests. 
IV. CASE STUDY OF A SUBSURFACE WOODEN-PILE SUPPORT 
SYSTEM: BOSTON'S BACK BAY 
Boston's Back Bay neighborhood provides an example of one lo-
cation where the removal of ground water that prevents the decay 
of subsurface wooden piles has caused structures to settle. 168 Until 
the middle of the nineteenth century, most of modern Boston was 
either submerged or part of a large tidal flat.169 A thin neck of land 
over three miles long connected what is now the North End, Finan-
166 [d. 
167 See id. 
168 Pokorny, supra note 10, at 37, col. 2. 
169 [d. at 38, eols. 1-2. 
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cial District, Waterfront, and Beacon Hill sections of the city to the 
mainland. 170 As Boston outgrew its natural boundaries, the city 
looked to the tidal swamp nearby.l7l In 1857, the Massachusetts 
legislature authorized an extensive project to fill the tidal flat.172 
Over thirty years and many tons of sand and gravel later, the Back 
Bay emerged as a planned residential neighborhood resting on a 
water-logged bed of soft peat and decayed organic matter covered 
with sand and gravel that had been hauled by train from hills west 
of the city.173 
Thousands of wooden piles support the stately townhouses for 
which Boston's Back Bay is famous. 174 Because Back Bay is a filled 
tidal flat, nineteenth century builders who lined the streets with 
Federal and Georgian facades had a valid reason to believe that the 
spruce pilings they used would support three and four story 
homes. 175 The builders knew that, because water almost completely 
surrounded Back Bay, the underground water level in the area would 
remain at the mean tidal level. 176 As a result, given the porous nature 
of the sand and gravel fill, these builders could safely use the wooden 
piles as subsurface support up to almost sea level. The water table 
could even fluctuate somewhat because large stone foundation slabs 
cap the piles below what was then the water table level. 177 These 
Back Bay builders reasonably assumed that the wooden piles would 
not decay because the water saturating this layer of landfill would 
protect them. 178 
What the builders did not know was that Boston would grow to 
become a dense urban area replete with an underground subway 
system, buried railroad embankments, tunnels for expressways, and 
a maze of sewer lines. 179 Back Bay alone now has an estimated 
170 See id. at col. 2 (map). 
171 Northeast Journal: A Problem Under Boston, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1985, at 34, col. 5 
[hereinafter N.Y. Sunday Times]. 
172 Resolve of May 26, 1857, ch. 70, 1857 Mass. Acts 688. 
173 Pokorny, supra note 10, at 38, col. 2. 
174 [d. at 37, col. 1. 
175 [d. at cols. 1-2. Although wood will rot when it is buried, if water surrounds the wood, 
the water protects the cellulose within the wood's cells from the fungi and bacteria that cause 
decay. [d. at col. 1. 
176 [d. at col. 1. 
177 N. Y. Sunday Times, supra note 171, at 34, col. 5. 
178 Pokorny, supra note 10, at 37, I:0ls. 1-2. The builders could safely use these wooden 
support piles up to sea level because the high content of water in the sand and gravel fill 
would suffice to protect the piles from decay. [d. 
179 [d. at col. 2. 
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population of 17,000 persons. 180 Located next to downtown Boston, 
Back Bay is a mixed-use residential and commercial neighborhood. 
Although necessary to maintain an urban neighborhood, this modern 
infrastructure may have contributed to lowering the water table and 
thus caused the decay of the wooden piles. 181 As early as 1929, the 
walls of the Boston Public Library, in the heart of Back Bay, began 
to crack. 182 Inspectors found that its wooden support piles had rotted 
because ground water had drained into a sewer line. l83 After this 
discovery, the city began to monitor ground water levels. 184 The 
federal Works Progress Administration (WPA) dug 700 observation 
wells throughout the Back Bay in the 1930s. 185 Experts also mapped 
the water table for the first time. 186 Unfortunately, most of these 
observation wells have been paved over and lost during the last fifty 
years. 187 
Since the early 1900s, Back Bay's water table has dropped more 
than two feet. l88 As water drains from the soil around the piles, 
fungi and bacteria that could not live in water begin to feed on the 
piles. 189 Engineers have estimated that it takes three to ten years 
to destroy a pile completely. 190 
Homeowners in the entire area face the possibility of having to 
replace the decayed wooden piles supporting their homes with con-
crete and steel foundation supportS. 191 Besides visible damage to 
walls and door or window frames, the condition of some of the piles 
may lead to pervasive damage making the buildings unsafe for oc-
cupation. 192 In May, 1985, the City of Boston's Inspectional Services 
Department sent six homeowners notices that they must apply for 
permits to repair their foundations or raze their buildings. 193 Re-
180 Bermar, Back Bay: Generational Elegance, Boston Globe, Nov. 15, 1986, at 37, col. 1. 
181 Pokorny, supra note 10, at 37, col. 2. 
182 [d. at 38, col. 2. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. 
185 [d. Massachusetts has recognized the importance of efforts to monitor ground water 
levels in deciding whether a defendant negligently drew off ground water. See Gamer v. Town 
of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 619, 621, 195 N .E.2d 65, 66, 67 (1964). 
186 Pokorny, supra note 10, at 38, col. 2. Mapping the water table is a way of recording 
ground water levels by the location of each observation well. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. at col. 1. 
189 Hudson, Sinking Feeling Hits Owners of Elegant Homes on Beacon Hill, Providence 
Sunday J., Oct. 13, 1985, at 20, col. 1. 
190 See id. 
191 See Pokorny, supra note 10, at 37, col. 2. 
192 Wells, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1. 
193 [d. 
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pairing townhouses on Brimmer Street, between Beacon Hill and 
Back Bay, has cost homeowners between $150,000 and $200,000, 
where in many cases only the upper two feet of piles had decayed. 194 
The rotted piles are soft and crumble at the touch. 195 Repairs include 
cutting the columns below the current water level and shoring them 
up with concrete and steel. 196 Experts investigating the problem 
have agreed that many other buildings in the filled areas of the city 
would be affected. 197 
Experts have found that one major cause of the drop in the water 
table is leaking sewer pipes that lie below the underground water 
level and drain off ground water.198 Water from the ground above 
the pipes seeps into them through their cracks and then flows 
away.199 Boston's Water and Sewer Commission has undertaken an 
extensive search for pipe leaks.20o This search has included dragging 
a special waterproof television camera through sewers on a cable. 201 
Fixing the pipes may involve digging them up and replacing them, 
a costly project that would also require diverting traffic from the 
already over-crowded streets and highways overlying the pipes.202 
An alternative to replacing the pipes is relining them, but some 
194 Id. at 38, col. 1. See also Kohn, Boston: That Sinking Feeling, Pilings Rot Away on 
Beacon Hill, USA Today, July 23, 1985, at B2, col. 2. A gro~p of building and condominium 
unit owners have filed a complaint against the Metropolitan District Commission, Boston 
Water and Sewer Commission, Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, the City of Boston, 
and a design consultant. Complaint, Brimmer Chambers Condominium Trust v. Metro. Dist. 
Comm'n, No. 87-1123 (Mass. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 27, 1987). In Count One, the plaintiffs 
allege that the defendant government agencies were negligent in failing to maintain the sewer 
and stormwater collection systems in a way that did not lower ground water levels and cause 
deterioration of wooden piles under their buildings. I d. The second count alleges the design 
consultant's negligence in failing to include plans for observation wells in its plans for a 
pumping station. I d. The complaint also claims that the government agencies violated their 
statutory mandates and that their activities amounted to both a private nuisance and an 
unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs' property. See id. The plaintiffs seek compensation for 
the loss of and damage to their buildings or units and an order to the defendant government 
agencies requiring them to develop a remedial plan to maintain ground water levels. See id. 
As of this writing, discovery on the case is underway, and the court has not set a trial date. 
195 Pokorny, supra note 10, at 38, col. 1. 
196 Id. 
197Id. See also In Boston, Real Downer: Beacon Hill Sinking as Pilings Rot, Int'l Herald 
Tribune, July 19, 1985, at 2, col. 6. 
198 Pokorny, supra note 10, cols. 2--3. See also B.R.A. REPORT, supra note 9, at 20. The 
diagram in Appendix A shows the subsurface support system under a Back Bay townhouse, 
the change in ground water levels, and their relationship to sewers below basement level. 
199 Pokorny, supra note 10, at 38, col. 1. 
200 See id. 
201Id. 
202 See id. 
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relining methods may succeed only if the cracks are small.203 Engi-
neers have already found cracks in the major sewer conduit serving 
part of Back Bay.204 These engineers are working to discover which 
cracks are draining the most ground water. 205 This process involves 
plugging and unplugging the pipes to find which cracks have the 
greatest effect on ground water levels. 206 Engineers have also dis-
covered that by increasing the water level in the main sewer conduit 
so that ground water does not flow into it from the outside, ground 
water levels in the affected area have risen.207 This fact indicates 
that the conduit is at least partially responsible for draining ground 
water from the layer of landfill in which the piles have decayed. 208 
Other possible causes for the lowering of the water table exist. 
Homeowners themselves could have leaks at their connections to the 
city's sewer lines. 209 A powerful sump pump that removes 20,000 
gallons of water per day from the underpass of a nearby expressway 
may also be draining local ground water.210 Finally, construction of 
a subway tunnel in the late 1930s required extensive and prolonged 
dewatering to levels below any other construction known up to 
1985.211 
In 1985, Boston City Council's Planning and Development Com-
mittee responded to the problem initially with a public hearing to 
address solutions to and responsibility for building foundation dam-
age caused by a lowered water table. 212 Testimony at the hearing 
203 [d. 
204 [d. at col. 2. 
205 [d. at col. 3. 
206 [d. 
207 [d. 
208 [d. 
209 [d. 
210 [d. Even in dry weather, this pump removes 20,000 gallons of water per day from an 
underpass situated below the water table level. This removal may be a large drain on local 
ground water. [d. See also B.R.A. REPORT, supra note 9, at 22. 
211 B.R.A. REPORT, supra note 9, at 20. 
212 Information Memo [sic]: Water Table Levels (July 15, 1985) (available from office of City 
of Boston Councilor David Scondras) [hereinafter Scondras Memo]. At the hearing, officials 
recognized that the city had been aware of the problem since 1929. There was general 
agreement that the city assume a prominent role in future water table monitoring, assigning 
responsibility for the drawdown, devising a corrective program, and determining if owners 
are entitled to compensation. [d. Testimony at the hearing also indicated that what was 
originally perceived as a problem affecting only owners of stately townhouses in Boston's 
wealthier neighborhoods also threatened low-cost housing in the Fenway, a Boston neighbor-
hood that is also built on landfill. See Low-Cost Housing and Aquifer Depletion: Testimony 
Before the Boston City Council (1985) (testin.ony of Galen Gilbert, Secretary, Fenway Com-
munity Development Corporation). This testimony indicated that many apartment building 
owners in this neighborhood could not afford necessary foundation repairs without large rent 
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and reports from outside consultants hired by the city indicated four 
areas for remedial efforts: 1) recovering and using as many as pos-
sible of the 700 monitoring wells installed by the WP A; 2) exploring 
ways to raise the water table level; 3) seeking federal disaster relief 
aid for affected homeowners; and 4) creating a compensation pool 
funded by state or municipal agencies, public utilities, or private 
companies responsible for lowering the water table. 213 
Almost a year later, the city established the Boston Ground Water 
Trust214 to receive private sector donations to fund the drilling of 
water table observation wells. 215 Establishment of the Trust resulted 
from nine months of negotiations among city and state officials and 
business community leaders in search of both a long term ground 
water monitoring system and financial relief to property owners who 
have already suffered damages from a lowered water table. 216 Ini-
tially, the Trust will pay for ground water monitoring. 217 The Trust 
will then analyze the data, conduct studies and make recommenda-
tions on both short and long term solutions. 218 One city council mem-
ber has also proposed an ordinance that would require anyone pump-
ing more than 400 gallons of water per day to get a permit. 219 For 
Boston, the Ground Water Trust and a permitting program to mon-
itor significant drawdowns are the beginnings of a solution to a 
complex and potentially disastrous problem. 
hikes that would effectively displace low income tenants. See id. In the alternative, the owner 
would have to raze the building and sell the lot. If this happened, the pressure to replace the 
low cost housing with a luxury development would be enormous. Either way, foundation 
deterioration would become a problem for both high and low income city residents. See id. 
213 See generally Scondras Memo, supra note 212, at 1-3. Boston City Councilor David 
Scondras also wrote to Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis asking the state to apply 
for funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to compensate area 
building owners. See also Wells, Scondras to Release Plan to Monitor Downtown Water Table, 
Boston Tab, May 13, 1986, at 1, col. 2. 
214 BOSTON, MA., CODE ch. 11, § 400 (1986). 
215 [d. See also Wells, supra note 213, at 1, col. 2; Frisby, Ground Water Level Concern: 
Hotel Pledges Donation to Trust That Would Examine the Problem, Boston Globe, June 4, 
1986, at 22, col. 4. 
216 Wells, supra note 213, at 1, col. 2. 
217 Boston City Council, Press Release (June 3, 1986) (available from office of Boston City 
Councilor David Scondras). 
218 [d. At least one trustee, however, foresees funding the Trust with contributions from 
the governmental agencies or private companies responsible for water table drawdown and 
using the fund to compensate building owners for foundation repairs. Interview with Galen 
Gilbert, Trustee, Boston Ground Water Trust (Feb. 16, 1988). 
219 Chapman, Legislation Aims to Aid Beacon Hill Water Table, Boston Sunday Herald 
Downtown, Oct. 25, 1987, at 2, col. 1. The permit would also require that water pumped from 
a construction site must be rerouted so that it recharges the water table. [d. 
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V. GROUND WATER WITHDRAWALS AND DECAYED SUBSURFACE 
WOODEN PILES: SUPPORT LAW OR GROUND WATER LAW? 
Support law and ground water law approaches to ground-water-
loss subsidence have developed simultaneously. Each approach be-
gan with an absolute-right based rule, either the absolute right of 
landowners to pump ground water from beneath their land220 or the 
absolute right of the land itself to the support of adjacent land. 221 In 
ground water law, courts have narrowed the old rule of nonliability 
by describing the kinds of uses permitted222 or imposing objective 
standards on the acceptability of interference with others' ground 
water.223 In lateral support law, courts have limited the general rule 
of strict liability for land in its natural state by changing the standard 
when improvements are present on the supported land. 224 
Courts' efforts to limit support law's strict liability standard have 
led to the application of a negligence standard when improvements 
to land suffer settlement damage. 225 Some jurisdictions require an 
initial finding of whether the improvement subsided due to its own 
weight or whether it contributed to the land's subsidence. 226 If an 
improvement's weight has contributed to the settlement, the appro-
priate standard for actions causing injury to that improvement is 
negligence. 227 One jurisdiction applies a negligence standard without 
this initial finding whenever improvements are present.228 Either 
one of these two support law approaches provides relief when neg-
ligent actions cause settlement of improvements. 
When withdrawal of some mix of water and soil causes settlement 
damage to improvements, courts have continued to apply support 
law's negligence standard under either one of the two approaches to 
improvements described above.229 Alaska,230 Rhode Island,231 and 
Massachusetts232 have applied support law when the removal of 
quicksand or semi-liquids caused settlement. In 1964, Massachusetts 
220 See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text. 
221 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra notes 50-52, 65-66 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text. 
226 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text. 
227 See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. 
228 See Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65, 67 (1964). 
229 See generally supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text. 
230 See Williams v. Anderson Constr. Co., 105 F. Supp. 497 (D. Alaska 1952). 
231 See Prete v. Cray, 49 R.I. 209, 141 A. 609 (1928). 
232 See Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 44 N.E. 344 (1869). 
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went a step further in Gamer v. Town of Milton. 233 The Gamer court 
concluded that, even though the defendant removed only water from 
the land adjacent to the plaintiffs' homes, support law governed. 234 
To apply support law to ground water loss and the wooden-pile 
support problem, a court should recognize the hydrological and 
chemical principles that allow water to function as a supporting 
substance. Where ground water withdrawals cause the decay of 
subsurface wooden piles, courts would have to extend the water-as-
support concept to include water's functioning as a barrier to the 
decay of the wood. A court would have to recognize that both the 
physical and chemical properties of water can provide support. 
When ground water loss causes wooden piles to decay, results 
under support law analysis may differ depending on whether a court 
makes the initial finding of causation-in-fact. If a court goes directly 
to the negligence analysis for improvements, its response would be 
that because wooden piles are improvements, negligence is the ap-
propriate standard. However, if a court makes the initial finding of 
causation-in-fact, strict liability could conceivably attach for injury 
to wooden piles.235 The reason for imposing strict liability when 
causation-in-fact is a threshold determination is that the piles them-
selves would not have deteriorated had the water table remained at 
historical levels.236 Therefore, any party responsible for a ground 
water drawdown that resulted in a loss of the water's support for 
the piles could be held strictly liable for injury to the piles. This 
result, obtained when loss of support is equated with deterioration, 
would undermine the purpose of limiting the strict liability standard 
only to land in its natural state. 237 Addressing damage to wooden 
piles in this manner would effectively permit the owner of a building 
supported by wooden piles to increase the burden on neighboring 
landowners to maintain ground water levels high enough to support 
233 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1964). 
234 [d. 
235 At least two jurisdictions have applied strict liability when improvements were present 
on the land. See supra notes 30-49 and accompanying text. 
236 The question could be whether the land surface itself would have settled from the 
drawdown in the water table, and if it would have, strict liability would attach. See Prete v. 
Cray, 49 R.I. 209, 141 A. 609 (1928). See also note 64. Because the wooden piles are beneath 
and not on top of the land surface, however, this way of framing the issue should apply in a 
way that considers only damage to the piles. The loss of support for the piles is occurring 
below the surface of the land itself. Within this landfill layer, if ground water drawdown is 
great enough, materials composing this layer will compact. Effects of this compaction would 
transmit upwards as subsidence of the land. See DUNNE & LEOPOLD, supra note 3, at 227-
29. Analyzing causation-in-fact by considering the land surface, however, would be appropriate 
when assigning responsibility for damage to structures supported by the wooden piles. 
237 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
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subsurface improvements. To avoid this result, a court should con-
sider the piles themselves as contributing to their own decay when 
ground water levels decline. If a court does so, under either support 
law analysis involving improvements, negligence is the appropriate 
standard. 
A better way to avoid such an all-or-nothing approach is to char-
acterize the wooden piles' need for water as a use of ground water. 
The wooden piles' dependence on the presence of ground water is a 
use of water for the maintenance of a man-made support system. 
Rather than requiring a water table drawdown as do most other 
uses, maintaining this subsurface support system requires water 
table levels to remain the same over time. 
Courts have grappled with a choice of law for the water-loss 
subsidence problem ever since Popplewell v. Hodkinson, an 1896 
English case in which the plaintiff, whose cottages settled when a 
builder drained adjacent land, argued that the right to ground water 
and the right to support from ground water are distinct. 238 Jurisdic-
tions that have followed or modified Popplewell's ground water rule 
of nonliability have based their decisions on the presence of water 
as a supporting substance. 239 
One modern case, Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-South-
west Industries, in which the court applied water law to ground-
water-loss subsidence, changed Texas's ground water law prospec-
tively to offer protection to future victims of a serious and wide-
spread subsidence problem. 240 After several calls for legislative re-
form of ground water law,241 the court applied ground water law in 
the face of rapidly declining water supplies and in recognition of 
recent legislative action to monitor withdrawals to prevent further 
subsidence. 242 In another modern case, a court has chosen ground 
water law when the defendant's withdrawals were within the court's 
definition of acceptable uses. 243 This court chose water law arbitrarily 
and failed to mention criteria other than possible harsh results and 
abuses under the general rule of nonliability.244 One later case, State 
v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc. ,245 applied a draft of the new 
Restatement (Second) § 858 that incorporates a reasonableness stan-
238 Popplewell v. Hodkinson, 4 L.R.-Ex. 248, 250 (1869). 
239 See supra notes 114-20, 132-37 and accompanying text. 
240 576 S.W.2d 21,30-31 (Tex. 1978). 
241 Teutsch, supra note 7, at 315-16. 
242 See Friendswood, 576 S. W.2d at 30. 
243 Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 432, 439, 428 A.2d 106, 109, 113 (1968). 
244 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
245 63 Wis. 2d 278,217 N.W.2d 339 (1974). 
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dard and a balancing approach to claims by various ground water 
users. 246 Although these cases have gone beyond the earlier, absolute 
rule of nonliability for almost any withdrawal of ground water, only 
the courts in Michels and Friendswood made a choice based on an 
allocation of risks and responsibilities among the parties dictated by 
the conditions of the water supply in the region. 247 
Even though failure of the wooden-pile support system differs 
from the deep aquifer depletion problem that caused subsidence in 
Friendswood, both problems create situations in which a group of 
building owners depend upon ground water levels to prevent sub-
sidence.248 Both the Friendswood and the Restatement (Second) ap-
proaches would protect building owners, dependent on ground water 
for support of wooden piles, from negligent ground water withdraw-
als. 249 
The Restatement (Second) goes beyond Friendswood, however, to 
establish a more equitable water law approach because it provides 
for a thorough inquiry into all users' needs and the availability of 
local sources to meet those needs. 250 The Restatement (Second) ap-
proach also balances one user's interest in withdrawing a reasonable 
amount for a beneficial use against a user who requires the water 
table to remain at current levels. 251 Choosing a ground water ap-
proach that permits this balancing process allows water table main-
tenance at an historic level to the extent that it does not prevent 
necessary beneficial uses. 
Under modern ground water law, however, courts may have to 
permit harm to wooden piles if ground water becomes a scarce 
resource. In this scenario, a court would consider the benefits of a 
local withdrawal for the needs of many and the costs of obtaining 
water from another source. The court would have to weigh these 
factors against the benefits of using this wooden-pile support system 
and the costs of replacing wooden piles with other structural sup-
ports not requiring ground water. Short of a natural disaster or an 
unusual climatic change, it is unlikely that this situation would arise 
in an area where ground water has been plentiful enough to permit 
the wooden-pile system in the first place. Nevertheless, this possi-
bility should not prevent a jurisdiction from adopting the balancing 
246 [d. 
247 See supra notes 113-26, 150-54 and accompanying text. 
248 See supra notes 113-16, 174-78 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 120, 163 and accompanying text. 
250 See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text. 
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approach of modern ground water law over older ground water 
doctrine, or even ·support law, as a solution to this problem. 
Although modern ground water law stresses maintaining water 
table levels, it also provides objective criteria for determining 
whether a particular ground water use causes unreasonable harm to 
other users. 252 Under modern ground water law, courts consider 
factors such as whether the withdrawals are in quantities not com-
mon to the locality and the fairness of placing the costs of alternatives 
on the person whose use renders local supplies inadequate for other 
reasonable uses. In addition to providing an objective standard by 
which courts can judge past actions, modern ground water law pro-
vides standards by which a legislatively created ground water au-
thority can balance the needs of competing ground water users. 
Thus, if a wooden-pile support system fails because the water table 
has declined, modern ground water law as expressed in the Restate-
ment (Second) not only provides an approach to the problem that 
balances competing users' interests, but also sets forth criteria by 
which courts and ground water authorities can evaluate future 
ground water needs and supplies. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The settlement of structures resting on wooden piles that have 
decayed as a result of ground water loss provides an example of a 
settlement problem that Boston and other older, coastal cities will 
have to address in the next several years. A landowner's right to 
ground water that prevents the decay of an artificial support system 
involves the interplay of support and ground water law. 
When artificial additions such as subsurface wooden piles are pres-
ent, support law analysis culminates in holding defendant water-
users either to a negligence standard of due care in making with-
drawals or to a strict liability standard under the line of cases that 
first determine whether the improvement itself contributed to its 
own injury. Either way, support law analysis rests on characterizing 
decay of the piles as a failure of water to provide support. 
The need for water to prevent decay of subsurface wooden piles 
is also usufructory in nature. Rather than depending on the natural 
presence of water pressure as part of a geological system beneath 
the land, subsurface wooden piles depend upon water's chemical 
252 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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properties to prevent decay. Thus, the wooden piles' needs become 
a use of ground water that must compete with other possible uses. 
Modern ground water law, as expressed in the Restatement (Sec-
ond), is best able to assign rights and responsibilities among com-
peting users such as building owners dependent upon a subsurface 
wooden-pile support system. Like support law, modern ground 
water law provides a negligence standard that applies to all parties 
claiming a need for available ground water. In addition, modern 
ground water law provides criteria by which courts or a local water 
protection authority can balance maintaining current levels against 
other possible beneficial uses and plan for future use or protection 
of local ground water. 
